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Is it possible to explain the validity of an inference? 
 
S. O. Welding 
 
 
Since Aristotle we acknowledge with a valid inference that from true premises a true 
conclusion follows necessarily, or, in other words, that a false conclusion cannot be deduced 
from true premises. Unfortunately, this notion of validity is compatible with logically false 
premises or logically true conclusions, and consequently with inferences involving “the 
paradox of formal implication.”1 It seems that it should be possible to explain how 
inferences are conceived to be valid. This question has obviously been left unanswered in 
Kneale's statement: “Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inferences.”2 The 
introductory remarks by Hintikka and Sandu are similarly vague: 
“It is far from clear what is meant by logic or what should be meant by it. It is 
nevertheless reasonable to identify logic as the study of inferences and inferential 
relations. The obvious practical use of logic is in any case to help us to reason well, to 
draw good inferences. And the typical form the theory of any part of logic seems to be 
a set of rules of inference. This answer already introduces some structure into a 
discussion of the nature of logic, for in an inference we can distinguish the input called 
a premise or premises from the output known as the conclusion. The transition from a 
premise or a number of premises to the conclusion is governed by a rule of inference. 
If the inference is in accordance with the appropriate rule, it is called valid.”3 
The “transition from a premise or a number of premises to the conclusion” appears to be not 
sufficiently clarified if it is merely governed by appropriate rules of inference. What are the 
basic concepts of the truth of the premises and of its relation to the truth of the conclusion? I 
think that an instructive answer to this question can be attained (I) by revising the concept of 
                                                 
1 W. Ackermann, „Begründung einer strengen Implikation“, Journal of Symbolic Logic 21 (1956), (113-128); 
A. Anderson / N. Belnap, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, I-II, I Princeton NJ / London: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1975, II (mit J. M. Dunn) Princeton NJ / Oxford: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992; S. 
Read, Relevant Logic. A Philosophical Examination of Inference, New York [i.a.]: Blackwell, 1989. 
2 M. and W. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford: Clarendon, 1962, 1. 
3 J. Hintikka / G. Sandu, ‘What is Logic?‘, in: D. Jacquette, (ed.), Philosophy of Logic, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
2007, (13-39), 13. 
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logical connectives,4 (II) by expounding logical connectives as truth value relations, and (III) 





In two-valued classical logic it is almost generally agreed that logical connectives appear to 
be connectives of propositions, which were introduced, for instance, by Barwise and 
Etchemendy as follows: 
“The connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ are truth-functional connectives. Recall what this means: 
the truth value of a complex sentence built by means of one of these symbols can be 
determined simply by looking at the truth values of the sentence's immediate 
constituents. So to know whether P ∨ Q is true, we need only know the truth values of 
P and Q. This particularly simple behavior is what allows us to capture the meanings of 
truth-functional connectives using truth tables.”5 
Thus, two propositions are connected in formulae like p → q, p ∧ q and p ∨ q, which are 
determined to be true or false by referring to four truth possibilities and truth conditions in 
corresponding truth tables. Since, on the other hand, the truth values of the formulae p → p, 
¬ (p ∧ ¬ p) and p ∨ ¬ p are established only by two truth possibilities and truth conditions, 
we have difficulties to claim that these formulae are connections of two propositions similar 
to the former formulae. However, logicians maintain traditionally that p and ¬ p are different 
propositions in the law of non-contradiction ¬ (p ∧ ¬ p) and in the law of excluded middle p 
∨ ¬ p.6 For, according to them, the former law asserts that both p and ¬ p cannot together be 
false, but true, and the latter asserts that both p and ¬ p cannot together be true, but false. 
They deduce from both laws that p and ¬ p are contradictories as, for instance, Stebbing 
points out: 
“It should be observed that both the principle of excluded middle and the principle of 
contradiction are required to define ‘contradictory propositions’. The principle of 
                                                 
4 Cf. S. O. Welding, „Werden die Junktoren der klassischen Logik richtig interpretiert?” 
(http://www.digibib.tu-bs.de/?docid=00044002) 
5 J. Barwise / J. Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic, Stanford, California: CSLI Publ., 2002, 93. 




contradiction alone does not suffice to show that p and -p are contradictories; they 
might be contraries.”7 
Similarly, Tarski claims that both principles are necessary to show that p and ¬ p are 
contradictories; for from the principle of non-contradiction alone follows “one of these 
sentences must be false”, and from the principle of excluded middle alone follows “one of 
the two sentences must be true.”8 
If we take into account that p is the negation of ¬ p, evidently p and ¬ p are both together 
neither true nor false. Obviously, the assumption that p and ¬ p are connected as two 
different propositions in the formulae ¬ (p ∧ ¬ p) and p ∨ ¬ p as well as in p → p reveals to 
be logically inconsistent. On the other hand, if these formulae deal only with one 
proposition, we do not realize what then is asserted only of p. 
However, the doctrine of logical constants analyzed by means of truth functions might have 
been convincing from the explanation of truth value dependencies described by Whitehead 
and Russell: 
“It will be observed that the truth values of p ( q, p ▪ q, […] depend only upon those of 
p and q, namely the truth value of “p ( q” is truth if the truth value of either p or q is 
truth, and is falsehood otherwise; that of “p ▪ q” is truth if that of both p and q is truth, 
and is falsehood otherwise […].”9 
In this passage the expression ‘the truth values of . . .‘ does not refer to truth functions, but 
rather to the truth conditions of a proposition. If we assert that the truth of (i) ‘x is greater 
than y‘ depends only upon appropriate numbers substituted for ‘x‘ and ‘y‘, we describe only 
the conditions of truth for the proposition (i). Similarly, if we assert that the truth of (ii) 
“Jones is a man or Smith is a woman” depends only upon the truth at least of one of the 
propositions “Jones is a man” and “Smith is a woman”, we merely describe the conditions of 
truth for the proposition (ii). Likewise, if we assert in accordance with Whitehead and 
Russell that the truth values of (iii) p ∨ q depend only upon those of p and q, we obviously 
merely describe the conditions of truth and of falsehood for the proposition (iii). Clearly, a 
truth value dependency is only concerned with the truth conditions of a proposition 
                                                 
7 L. S. Stebbing, A Modern Introduction to Logic, 7th ed., London: Methuen, 1950, 191. 
8 Cf. A. Tarski, Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, transl. by O. Helmer. 3rd 
ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965, 135 f. and R. Blanché, L’Axiomatique, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1955, 42. 
9 A. N. Whitehead / B. Russell, Principia Mathematica, vol. I, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1927, 7 f. 
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What then is the content of a proposition about logical constants, for instance, about a 
disjunction? It is worth noting that the propositions (i) – (iii) have in common that each of 
them is about a two-termed non-functional relation, e.g. between the numbers x and y, the 
truth values of “Jones is a man” and “Smith is a woman” and between the truth values of p 
and q, respectively. Thus, the disjunction in (ii) and (iii) reveals itself to consist in a truth 
value relation. As to this definition of a disjunction in (iii) we should generalize, accordingly, 
that logical constants such as the affirmation, the negation of p, the conjunction p ∧ q, the 
disjunction p ∨ q and the implication p → q have to be defined as one- or two-termed non-
functional truth value relations. Thus logical constants are neither connectives of 





Since p → q is a proposition about the relation holding between the truth values of p and q, 
we should conclude that p → p asserts that the respective truth value of p implies itself; the 
repetition of ‘p‘ in this formula determines a reflexive relation holding between the truth 
values of p. Accordingly, we assert in ¬ (p ∧ ¬ p) that the respective truth value of p is 
incompatible with its negation, and in p ∨ ¬ p that the respective truth value of p excludes its 
negation. Consequently, the formulae p → p, ¬ (p ∧ ¬ p) and p ∨ ¬ p express logically 
differently the same reflexive relation holding between the truth values only of p.  
For developing valid inferences, we are now in the position to construe reflexive relations 
between the truth values of different propositions. Evidently, the formula 
(p → q) → (p → q)  
is not based only on the truth values of p, but this formula asserts like p → p that the 
respective truth value of p → q is identical with itself. On the other hand, a change of this 
formula will be sufficient for establishing a reflexive relation between the truth values of p 
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and q for instance in 
(p → q ∧ p) → q 
The validity of this inference is determined only by the truth of the premises; for if p is true, 
q must be true, and this is why the truth of the premises contains already the truth of the 
conclusion. Thus the condition between the truth of the premises and the truth of the 
conclusion is determined by a reflexive truth-valuable relation. The same method is applied 
for developing a reflexive relation on the basis of the truth values of more propositions for 
example in 
(p → q ∧ q → r) → (p → r) 
and its various reformulations. However, difficulties arise if the conjunction of the truth 
values of a proposition is added to the premises of this inference 
(p → q ∧ q → r ∧ s) → (p → r) 
Since the condition between the truth of the premises and the conclusion is not completely 
determined by the reflexive relationship, this inference should be considered not to be valid. 
The decisive point is this: If the truth values of the premises and the conclusion are partly or 
completely independent from each other, they cannot establish valid inferences. Thus the 
reflexive construction of valid inferences leads us to refuse logically false premises or 
logically true conclusions, and, moreover, logically true premises and logically true 
conclusions.10 
                                                 
10 Cf. S. O. Welding, Analytische Logik. Die Begründungsstruktur gültiger Schlüsse, 2nd ed., Münster: LIT 
Verlag, 2011. 
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